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Abstract 
 
Populist rhetoric always promises a new, more inclusive political community but very often this only 
achieves new ways of exclusion. Populism is one of the most flexible terms in the history of ideas and 
in political science therefore it can often co-exist with different regimes and ideologies. In the case of 
Hungary, populism appeared first as a reaction to Western capitalism and to the lost World War I, and 
offered a dream-like “garden country” against major international regimes, totalitarian or democratic. 
However, populism changed its character from time to time: it revived nationalism in the communist 
period, it expressed reservations to the elite-driven regime change, it featured anti-liberalism, and 
finally it presented itself as a renewed rhetoric of “nationalist neoliberalism”. Among the several 
understandings of populism, Edward Shils’ definition is accepted – this states that in populist 
discourse the will of the people enjoys top priority in the face of any other principle, right or 
institutional standard. Populism identifies the people with justice and morality. The discourse analytic 
approach to populism is broad enough to discuss different historical epochs with regard to populism 
without inflating the concept.  
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 1 
Introduction 
 
Populism, which once a feature of the Hungarian ‘népi’ (popular) writers’ movement, and was 
preserved in cultural tradition throughout the 20th century, appeared in different waves in the last 
decades. Populist ideas and policies never had the chance to provide a political alternative in a 
totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorship. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the 
faith of these political ideas was not clear. Moreover, its form – whether it would be a political idea, or 
a political style, or a political practice that is suitable for every purpose – was not clear either. 
Recently, populism re-appeared in a form of nationalist “package” of neoliberal economic policies.i 
With regard its nature populism has induced many radical ideas. Some thought it to be the ideological 
cover of fascism or the radical right, others believed it to be a statist economic policy, that could 
appear not only on the right but on the anti-liberal left as well, which was defending its position. 
Others thought that populism is a rather harmless phenomenon, because democracy cannot exist 
without some elements of populism in it; therefore populism is simply a demagogic way of speaking, a 
political style. Judging populism proved to be as controversial as the attempts at describing it, not only 
for those in politics but for observers as well.ii  
According to the class theory approach, populism is an expression of the interests of one or more 
classes (farmers, urban settlers, intellectuals, informal proletariat etc.) depending on the social and 
historical context. Others regard populism as a flexible, opportunistic, anti-ideological concept: much 
more of a syndrome than a doctrine.iii Many scholars insist that populism is an ideology which 
comprises some typical elements, for instance: “hostility to the status quo, mistrust of traditional 
politicians, appeal to the people and not to classes, and anti-intellectualism”.iv Recently, populism was 
defined as “an ideology which pits a virtuous and homogenous people, against a set of elites and 
dangerous others”.v Some say, populism is not an independent ideology but a variant of socialism, 
while others claim that populism can also be an expression of nationalism,vi radical right,vii or even 
neo-liberalism.viii  
Others follow a functionalist explanation by suggesting that populism is a premature incorporation of 
the masses into political life at times when political structures are unable to institutionalize 
participation.ix The weakness of the structures of representation, the lack of autonomous workers’ 
organizations, and the rising expectations of the masses create a particular social context favorable for 
populism.x Students of democracy may also use populism as indicator in distinguishing between 
liberal and illiberal democracies.xi 
Finally, populism can be analyzed within the framework of discourse analysis. Here, in the populist 
discourse politicians express the supposedly uniform interests of the people as an ultimate reference. 
Good and evil, workers and oligarchs, producers and parasites are presented as polar opposites in this 
political discourse, in which elites and migrants, minorities do not “truly” belong to the people. 
Therefore populism is not a singular phenomenon linked to a certain age and phase of development. It 
can accommodate itself in different social contexts and political regimes.   
In this paper, my approach is based on Edward Shils’ classic definition of populism, the one that I 
found most comprehensive. This approach can be interpreted as the forerunner of the discourse 
analytic school of thought, which gained prominence in research on populism as well. “According to 
populism the will of the people enjoys top priority in the face of any other principle, right, and 
institutional standard. Populists identify the people with justice and morality.”xii  
Generally populism promises a broad inclusion of the people to the political process. In the following, 
I will demonstrate that populist attitudes and policies served just the opposite goal in the European 
semi-periphery. Populism has not only been applied flexibly to different, contradictory politics, but it 
is often used for exclusionary political purposes. I aim to establish a typology of Hungarian populism 
as 1. fusion of nationalism and socialism in the interwar period (1919-45); 2. cultural nationalism in 
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the communist period (1948-88); 3. a form of discourse by intellectuals in politics during and after the 
transition (1987-94); 4. a form of anti-liberal discourse at the millennium (1998-2002); and 5. a fusion 
of nationalism and neo-liberalism most recently (2010-12). I will demonstrate that most of these forms 
of populism were presented rhetorically as new forms of political inclusion while those were mostly 
serving exclusionary policies. The many types and long durée dynamics of Hungarian populism seem 
to be one of the permanent characteristics of policy-making in the last decades.  
 
 
1. The Birth of Hungarian Capitalism and Its Social Discontents (1867-1914) 
 
The development of Hungarian society was induced from above and from the side of the border, and 
compared to the modernization of the West it was belated. The defeated Hungarian revolution of the 
mid-19th century failed to reach national independence, and it was at first part of the Habsburg 
Monarchy, and after the 1867 Compromise with the Austrians, it became equal to Austria in the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In the period between 1867 and 1914 the economy developed rapidly, 
the railway network of the country was developed; and the capital Budapest became a metropolis. The 
Czech and German skilled workers as well as emigrating Jewish traders played a significant role in 
this economic boom. An urban-bourgeois Hungary was in the making, its growing attraction was in 
direct contrast to the backward rural peasantry. However, in the relationship between the gentry and 
the unfolding bourgeois, the former remained decisive, it was not the nobility that developed a 
bourgeois mentality, but the thinner bourgeois stratum was adjusting itself to the gentry.xiii 
Assimilation to the Hungarians was synonymous to assimilation to the values and attitudes of the 
gentry middle class as an estate. Thus embourgeoisement, capitalist development and modernity were 
expressed in contrast to the ‘organically’ developed character of Hungarians: those who expressed the 
values of Hungarians often confronted them with the bourgeois-European values. The elements of the 
“homeland and progress” program, elaborated in the Reform Age in the first part of the 19th century, 
were fatally simple to be turned against each other. The true ‘patriot’ looked at the ‘Jewish’ capitalism 
with suspicion, while the representatives of the growing capitalist class cared very little about the 
problem of national independence.  
The Social Democratic Party of the age was just as much an urban phenomenon as the representation 
of the bourgeois political parties, hence it was unable to channel and handle the social tensions 
accumulating in the countryside. In the 1890s strikes by the harvesters and movements of the poor 
peasantry came in quick succession in the Plains. The agrarian movement of 1897-98 involved tens of 
thousands and turned against large estates as well as against big capital and social democracy. The 
political rise of these strata that were squeezed below society was equally suppressed by the politics of 
the gentry and the big estates and of liberalism. Thus, a broad-based authentic agrarian party could not 
develop in Hungary. What developed, however, represented the interests of landed Smallholders only, 
and the party gradually lost some of its social sensitivity and hence much of its significance in its 
bargains with gentry politics. The poor peasantry turned to religious sects that were advocating 
anarchistic principles, and instead of making new attempts to express their political will they turned 
away from politics.xiv  
World War I. meant an end to the hegemony of liberalism and conservatism all around Europe; new 
collectivist ideologies and movements (replacing the former ones in several cases) appeared: 
nationalism and socialism. World War I. and its tragic ending, which meant for Hungary the loss of 
two-thirds of its previous territory, deeply shocked the whole of society.   
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2. Populism as fusion of nationalism and socialism in the Horthy era (1919-44) 
 
The first significant Hungarian populist ideologist, the writer Dezső Szabó already assessed the 
outbreak of the World War as the”failure of individualism.” According to him, liberalism committed 
the sin of neglecting the collective identity of society and the war was a punishment.xv Ideologists of 
liberalism were forced onto the defensive, at first against socialists and syndicalists, then against 
nationalists. Following the revolution of 1918, the social-liberal government could not dissolve the 
tensions caused by the shock of the defeat in the war. Although, it tried to pursue a radical policy in 
the social field it proved to be weak; and for a transitory period of four months power was shifted to 
the communists. After the fall of the communist dictatorship, in the autumn of 1919, a right-wing 
‘Christian-national’ restoration began, and gradually consolidated itself. The ruling circles blamed 
liberalism for the war and for the temporary expansion of Bolshevism. Therefore, the moderate 
liberalism of the pre-1914 period could not return; the new regime could be characterized by a 
conservative, authoritarian, revanchist policy. In contrast to Peronism, the interwar Horthy-regime was 
unable and did not intend to involve the anti-liberal democratic forces. The politically articulated part 
of Hungarian society was split in two: besides the dominant ‘neo-baroque’ national-historical society, 
there was a weaker bourgeois society, which had developed under the capitalist growth. Below them 
there was a big mass of rural uneducated peasantry, which was left without political representation and 
was equally despised by the politics of the gentry and the bourgeoise.xvi 
In the 1920s the ideologists of the Hungarian ‘népi’ (populist) movement realized that if they wanted 
to make a stronger impact they must unite the national and the social radicalism. In their opinion the 
two revolutions (the bourgeois one in 1918, and the Bolshevik one in 1919) failed because they were 
socially radical but not nationally. Also, the emancipatory movements against social oppression could 
renew themselves only if they were able to open to the nation, or more precisely to the people. This 
renewal must come from the suppressed strata, from the peasantry, the new Hungarian middle class 
should be created out of them (because the existing middle class is of alien origin) and this new class, 
which is committed to the people, would be the promoter of social transformation. Peasantry means 
the people, and the people must be identical with the nation. This program was drawn up by Dezső 
Szabó in the early 1920s, in his series of articles entitled: “Towards a New Hungarian Ideology.”xvii 
The ‘népi’ (populist) movement was recruited from the company and followers of the populist 
writers,xviii and although it had members of peasant origins, it remained largely a middle class group 
of intellectuals. The populist writers of the 1930s were the ‘Hungarian Narodniks’ who, similar to 
their 19th century Russian predecessors, considered it their mission to mingle with ‘the people,’ and to 
document the problems of rural Hungary; the decreasing population, the spread of religious sects, 
poverty and the issue of land ownership. They hoped to achieve the reformation of government 
politics by honestly exhibiting the real and cruel life of the peasants.xix Their intention proved to be 
illusionary, even though populist writers personally contacted members of the governing circles. Later 
on, some of them drifted towards the political extreme right, whereas others moved towards the 
extreme left (the illegal Communist Party); but the core of the group of writers remained together and 
founded the National Peasant Party in 1938. This party however, never became an influential, 
mainstream party and after 1945 it became a ‘fellow-traveler,’ a closely co-operating ally of the 
communists. 
According to critics of this movement of writers in the 1930s, the initiative was not populist but 
völkisch, which paid service to anti-Semitism in the shadow of German Nazism.xx The sympathizers 
of the ‘népi’ (populist) movement, on the other hand, emphasized the plebeian, radical-democratic 
nature of the movement and stressed its social sensitivity.xxi As this present paper does not aim to 
discuss the populist vs. urban disputes in detailxxii in the following we only dwell upon problems 
linked to the nature of populism.  
The main issue concentrated on the unity or separation of political democracy and social reforms. Was 
social equality possible without democracy? Would the intentions of social reforms of an authoritarian 
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system be acceptable? Those who were thinking in the dichotomy of democratic left and right, refused 
to co-operate with representatives of the regime, saying that “neither popular self-government nor 
social progress can be imagined without personal freedom.”xxiii However, the system of co-ordinates 
of the populist was not left and right, rather upper and lower; thus when searching for a vertical 
alliance of classes they were more inclined to compromise with the authoritarian power, than were 
those urban thinkers, they called the doctrinaire.xxiv They were convinced that the people must be 
lifted out from their suppressed state, and questions of “dogmatism of the sides” were considered 
secondary. Although there are certain analyses that sharply separate left and right wing populisms,xxv 
populism is primarily characterized by a denial of this dichotomy, and is a mixture of the elements of 
Left and Right. 
While the Hungarian movement of népi (populist) writers considered the solution of the peasant issue 
to be one of its most important tasks, its attitude towards the peasantry becoming bourgeois was rather 
ambivalent. Besides the need for social democratization, it wanted, rather romantically, to preserve 
certain traits of the peasant way of life, more over, it wanted to base a specific Hungarian democracy 
on this, which was considered ‘deeper’ than the one in Western Europe.xxvi Putting emphasis on the 
national and social aspects laid the course for many of the representatives of the movement towards 
the racist extreme right or towards the communist extreme left. Characteristically, in Eastern Europe, 
the populist movements received greater sympathy from proto-fascist and communist groups, than 
liberals, social democrats and ruling national conservatives. The latter expressed reservations towards 
such movements. For communists however, the appearance of the populist movements represented the 
possibility of a future alliance between the working class and the peasantry, in the spirit of the 
revolutionary strategy and the policy of alliances of Lenin. The fascists regarded them as the natural 
continuation of the right wing movements of agrarian societies, who turned against the aliens 
symbolizing cosmopolitan life style and particularly against the Jews by an idealization of the 
peasantry.xxvii The relationship of the Hungarian extreme right and the writers’ movement is fittingly 
described by the following fact: the former criticized the popular writers’ movement because by 
emphasizing the issue of land reform and large estates it diverted attention from the “Jewish question”. 
On the other hand, the majority of the populists, who did not interpret the social reforms in terms of 
protecting the races, felt that the extreme right was the one that diverted attention from the truly 
important issue: land reform.xxviii 
During the interwar period in Hungary, no populist government policy could evolve for the following 
reasons. The government – with the exception of the premiership of Gyula Gömbös (1932-6) when the 
interests of the lower middle class were represented verbally - was not inclined to channel the 
democratic demands coming from below. 
Initiatives coming from below and induced by growing social tensions were attempted to be 
articulated by extremist political forces that were too radical to participate in the organization of a 
broad social coalition. The middle class was thin and weak: its majority of national sentiment made a 
compromise with the Horthy-regime its bourgeois groups, for reasons of their Jewish origins, were 
forced onto the defensive against the representatives of the regime, and their isolation made it 
impossible for them to form a broader social coalition. 
The peasantry was squeezed below society, and for this reason it was unable to articulate its interests 
itself, and to enter into political alliance. The népi writers attempted to close this social gap with their 
activities, but they themselves proved to be of limited influence: neither the political class of the 
Horthy-regime, nor the national middle class, that entered into a compromise with the regime, or the 
isolated bourgeois strata, and not even the targeted peasantry could have been mobilized by them. 
Thus the function of their writings remained primarily to keep social self-conscience alive. 
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3. Populism as cultural nationalism in the Communist period (1948-88) 
 
The defeat suffered during World War II, the following brief spell of democracy and the communist 
change of 1948 fundamentally transformed the structure of Hungarian society. The gentry elite was 
wiped out, a large part of the bourgeois middle class was destroyed by the War. In the 1940s many 
people migrated to West from both strata. In the 1945 land reform more than one million peasants 
were given land, which was subsequently forced onto kolkhozes. A larger proportion of the rural poor 
were absorbed by forced industrialization in the totalitarian communist regimes which was associated 
with the name of communist leader, Mátyás Rákosi (1948-56). This period of time was ended by the 
anti-totalitarian revolution of 1956.  
The ‘soft dictatorship’ of the reformist politics of consolidation launched by János Kádár in the 1960s, 
was able to make society digest the shock of the 1940s and 1950s. The old issues raised by the 
populist writers (large estates, land, agrarian poverty) became obsolete. Populist thought however, 
survived in a cultural form, linked to literature, and in the meantime it did good service to the 
opponents of reform with the criticism of Western modernization and consumer society. It played a 
role in the revival of national traditions from the seventies onwards and, as a new element it put on the 
agenda the problem of Hungarian minorities living on the other side of the border, in other countries. 
Thus it tried to make populist cultural heritage a national one, and also to maintain the idea of “middle 
of the road” – which had a different meaning earlier – equally turning against Western liberal 
capitalism and Eastern internationalist communism. Populists found internationalism common to both, 
they condemned the economic influence of the Western multinational concerns as well as the power 
monopoly of the Soviet type system. They tended to regard both as foreign oppression. Although the 
messages of populist writers could not be explicit due to censorship it was this group which 
established the nationalist interpretation of populism with special attention to the situation of 
Hungarian minorities living abroad. 
Communist cultural policy, associated with the name of György Aczél, culture boss of the communist 
party, tried to use the populist reappearance to divide the opposition; appearing also in the late 1970s, 
suggesting, that the two kinds of – Western and populist – criticism could not have a common 
platform, as the “urban” opposition groups were Jewish, and the ‘népi’ (populists) were not. This 
whispering propaganda, which was amplified by the populists at the rhyme of systemic change,xxix 
has again made anti-Semitism and the conflict between Jews and non-Jews a (not so transparent) 
political issue. It meant a past anachronism for the younger generations that have grown up in the 
shadow of the Kádár-system and have heard about the “Jewish question” and the populist vs. “urban” 
conflict only from history books.xxx 
 
 
4. Populism as discourse of intellectuals who entered democratic politics (1987-94) 
 
By the second part of the 1980s, the cultural criticism of popular origins was replaced by the 
organization of political movements with the pluralization of the intelligentsia and  society,xxxi and 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Fórum, MDF) which was established as a loose 
intellectual association in Lakitelek in September 1987, was transformed into a political organization a 
year later. Not accepting “either the tag of pro-government or of opposition and the pressure of 
choice,”xxxii initially the Forum did not function as a party, yet it was active as a party that collected 
groups from a wide range. Populist thinking emerged from its purely cultural forms and reappeared on 
the political stage. It reappeared under such historical conditions that its effect could become far 
greater than that of the former National Peasant Party. The disappearance of the Soviet oppression, the 
return of national sovereignty, the seeming ‘classlessness’ of the Kádár era, the desire for a welfare 
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society and the lack of new political ideas apparently strengthened the assumption that the time may 
have come for the renaissance of populism. 
By then however, the anti-capitalism of the late successors of the populist writers was in contrast to 
the embourgeoisement of the majority of Hungarian society. Thus what they represented was rather 
romanticism, the respect of traditions, moralizing and nationalism – in addition to the demand for 
economic democracy and social securityxxxiii – that remained from populism. The advocates of the 
‘middle-of-the-road’ attitude, setting out as leftists, allied themselves with those authentically center-
right gentry-conservative politicians in order to ensure their success at the elections, and whose 
predecessors were the adversaries of the populist intelligentsia of the 1930s.xxxiv The national issue, 
as separate from the popular radicalism, became the common denominator of their alliance. This 
political change that apparently parted from populism – coupled with the moderate message of the 
‘calm force,’ successfully reaching the middle strata – brought about the electoral success of MDF, 
organizing itself into a party. The President of the party, the liberal-conservative József Antall became 
Prime Minister. Although the concept of the nation of conservatives and populists was initially 
different – the conservatives were thinking in terms of a historical nation-state and the populists in 
cultural nation – yet they were brought closer by the moral interpretation of their political mission. 
Their objective was to present the entire right (from center to the extremes) in a single, big party, but 
their co-operation did not prove to be lasting.  
The difficulties of economic transformation, growing unemployment and the downward slide of one 
part of the middle class have again strengthened social dissatisfaction. The voice of radicalism 
growing stronger in the debates of the bills on “doing justice,” compensation and the returning of the 
property of the Church, suppressed that of the moderates representing the “calm force.” István Csurka, 
then vice-president of MDF and leader of his movement the Hungarian Road (Magyar Út) used this 
moment to launch an attack against professional politicians of his party – and through them, against 
the democratic system – in August 1992, and provoked the gravest crisis in the history of MDF.  In his 
manifesto Csurka demanded that the wing of MDF that was of ‘national spirit’ (extreme right in 
essence) should remove the “liberal” Antall government that engaged in a “politics of pacts,” or 
should press it to settle the political conflicts by force and not by compromises. Csurka presented a 
theory of conspiracy, by which he explained why the “issues of Hungarian destiny” were not solved, 
arguing that the parties in opposition were intertwined with Western liberal finance circles, which – 
because they were Jewish – finance the representatives of the communist nomenclature, turned 
managers. Their common feature was that they were alien to Hungarians – as contrasted to the 
“national middle class rooted in the people” which recreates itself – therefore they were unable to 
understand the problems of Hungarians even if they wanted to. All this would excuse the national-
populist forces from the pressure of seeking compromises.xxxv  
Nevertheless, Csurka failed to impress the middle class by his anti-Semitic proposals, for which the 
values of bourgeois welfare had been more attractive than the exclusivity and witch-hunt of the 
Hungarian Road. In his later writing Csurka did not strive to create a national middle class, rather, he 
tried to mobilize the “bitter hinterland” of the common people.xxxvi With this he tried to return to the 
populism of the popular writers who turned to the underclass, instead of turning to the middle class 
populism of Dezső Szabó. Although Csurka sensed accurately the growing inequalities of Hungarian 
society, he was wrong when he thought that he would be able to mobilize those who were sliding 
towards the periphery, by anti-elitism and nationalism.  Thus he found himself the representative of 
extreme rightist radicalism: he has become the Hungarian Le Pen. In his writings he has gone from 
anti-communismxxxvii to a comprehensive, combatant criticism of liberalism.xxxviii 
To solve existing social tensions, a true populist policy would wish to find such political alternatives 
that can be realized (or are at least credible), rather than adjust the existing people to an imaginary 
political ides. Despite all his qualities, Csurka could not become a populist politician because the 
preconditions of populist politics of the “Argentine type” that concern the people were missing for the 
realization of his program. The majority of the unemployed was unskilled, rather than skilled, thus was 
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in a far more disadvantageous position. In Argentina populist governmental policy could establish 
itself as a result of collective action of the large, mobile and skilled emigrant (and other) groups. In 
Hungary, however, the equivalent groups did not think of collectively asserting their political interests. 
They aimed at developing individual strategies instead or (less typically) at the protection of economic 
interests. The older and less educated people tended to turn away from the entire political order, while 
younger generations faced with increasing difficulties to enter the labor market.
xxxix
   
Successful populist politicians are popular, easy to understand and above all their political messages 
can be followed by the targeted masses. They tend to say what the people want to hear from them: for 
that they need flexibility and pragmatism. Csurka’s political aims, however, were too radical for the 
masses. For these reasons, his message was not open and inclusive, but isolating, racist, and 
exclusive.
xl
 He represented a sort of ‘old school’ Right wing populism of literary intellectuals which 
gradually lost its appeal. 
 
 
5. Why there was no chance for Peronism in Hungary 
 
Social science literature often referred to Latin America – and the process of latin-americanization – as 
a possible scenario for Eastern Europe after the years of transition. Some exponents of this proposition 
argued that peripheral capitalism would probably produce illiberal democracies, if not hybrid regimes, 
with or without populism.xli Some tended to see Peronism as an option for the post-communist 
regimes, or if not, as something like a lesson to be learned. The appearance of authoritarian political 
leaders like Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia, Lukashenka in Belarus or 
Franjo Tudjman in Croatia in the 1990s could indeed give ground to this impression. More than 
twenty years after the transition there are some strong signs of peripheral capitalism in the region, 
especially the widening gap between the rich and the poor, which might be reminiscent of Latin 
America. Nevertheless, the resurrection of Peronist populism in East Europe was not a realistic way to 
go in the post-transition years.xlii 
 By his style and political tactics, the Hungarian József Torgyán the President of the Independent 
Smallholders’ Party (Független Kisgazdapárt, FKGP) of the 1990s could be regarded as an ideal-
typical populist politician. Although Torgyán was an excellent speaker, a real demagogue, in the 
original sense of the term, who understands all the tricks of “low speech,” his relative lack of success 
was caused by his lack of political strategy and program: he demanded total re-privatization and to 
speak against (supposedly) foreign interests in defense of the homeland. His prime objective was to 
recruit followers at all cost,xliii and his exaggerated promises with no concept only ended up 
ridiculous. His party was a party of ‘nostalgia’ for the pre-communist times that was unable to attract 
supporters from any other social groups beside the rural, uneducated and aged population and the 
easily definable, relatively small group of farmers. The methods used by József Torgyán to expand his 
electoral base, closely resembled the strategic steps of President Juan Domingo Perón in the 1940s in 
Argentina; his actress wife attempted to organize a “Torgyán party,” and Ágnes Maczó the female 
populist ideologist, who had five children and who referred to herself as the “representative of the 
people”, was pushed into the foreground.xliv Compared to Perón, his possibilities were far more 
limited. Nevertheless, he remained an important figure of the Hungarian post-communist politics until 
2002.xlv 
In Hungary, despite the occasional lack of legitimacyxlvi of the new democratic regime, the chances 
of national and social populist politics were limited in the first part of the 1990s. It was equally due to 
the heritage of the “soft communist” past of the Kádár regime, and to the general economic and 
political characteristics of transformation. Among these features I mention the following ones:   
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In the Kádár-regime the majority of society followed individualist strategies of survival, and during 
the course of acquiring these strategies, people had become less susceptible to collectivist political 
demagogy. 
Long after the fall of communism, the size of those groups that had nothing to lose was limited, their 
conditions were deteriorating, and this kept them from supporting such political actions. 
Politics appealing to the people, and alluding to a state-defined concept of justice, had been present in 
Hungary in extreme forms (fascism, communism), and have caused serious damage and 
backwardness. The memories of these were alive for a long time. Hungary after 1989 was more a 
“post-populist”, individualistic society than a pre-populist one.xlvii  
The soft dictatorship of the Kádár era had created the still functioning informal patron-client lines, 
along which people could assert their interests informally, and compensate for the losses suffered in 
the economic transformation. 
In the first years of communist rule in Hungary, in the 1950s, people had the opportunity to see the 
disadvantages of ‘personality cult,’ and thus became sceptic towards it. The relative popularity of 
János Kádár was the result of the fact that he was against personalization of politics. 
The small size of the country and its dependence upon world economy limited the space of economic 
nationalism, which is a feature of populism. The broad masses of Hungarian society see no alternative 
to the desirable, Western welfare democracies. There was no massive aversion to the penetration of 
Western capital can be experienced in Hungarian society, people rather wanted to have their share of 
the benefits.  
In the society during the regime change the intelligentsia that was committed to the ideals of 
liberalism, democracy, and autonomy of the individual was quite influential.xlviii 
For the decisive social strata, those who could take part in a conflict, the concept of capitalism and 
democracy seemed to belong together. The social strata, which would have been able to produce Latin 
American type of populism, form an alliance and demand democracy as well as authoritarian 
paternalism was missing. 
Populism usually evolves in places where considerable social groups believe that there is much to be 
distributed, so they hope that by changing the internal proportions of social redistribution, they might 
find themselves in a more favourable position. But due to the indebtedness of the country and the 
initial strength of the belief in “entrepreneurial spirit” no such belief was apparent in Hungary in the 
early years of post-communist democracy.xlix 
A characteristic feature of populism is confidence in the central role of the state, but in Hungary such 
confidence and the expectations resulting from it were missing; and even if they had existed, the weak 
state heavily in debt was not in a position to meet these expectations.  
Paradoxically, the relatively strong individualism of Hungarian society and its scepticism toward the 
state in the 1990s did not only weaken the credibility of the new democracy (which could not exist 
without an accepted authority of the state), but it also hindered the development of populism 
temporarily (which cannot flourish long without the belief in a strong, paternalistic, redistribute state).l 
The chances of populist mobilization were further reduced by the fact that there were underclass 
groups that were turning away from politics, were falling behind, and even formed ghettos, which 
could not be mobilized by any kind of political agitation, not even by populism. 
Social, economic and cultural conditions did not favor the Latin America scenario. But this condition 
started to change with the austerity package of 1995, a late promotion of shock therapy by the 
socialist-liberal coalition government. At the beginning, dissatisfied groups, those that were sinking 
into poverty and falling behind, oriented themselves towards the extreme right to a lesser extent, and 
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to a greater extent towards the old-school socialists. Thus, the mixture of left and right, which crosses 
class boundaries, gained influence.  
 
 
6. Populism from below: Failed attempts for a more inclusive polity in the 1990s 
 
In Hungary, the strikes organized by the trade unions have been able to mobilize only few people, and 
they were not able to influence government policy in the 1990s. The strongest trade union the National 
Alliance of Hungarian Trade Unions (Magyar Szakszervezetek Országos Szövetsége, MSZOSZ) liked 
to use elements of populist politics (putting the values of ‘justice,’ which wre difficult to grasp ahead 
of other social values, political demagogy, etc.). However, this was not populism, because the anti-
elitism and challenging the system of democratic institutions and the desire for independent political 
roles were rather limited to the trade unions. The largest unions  more oriented towards 1) acquiring 
suitable positions for their negotiations with the employers and government in the field of economy; 2) 
acquiring political influence in the leftist parties, particularly in the Hungarian Socialist Party. 
Demagogy itself cannot be identified with populism, though it is undoubtedly part of it. Demands that 
are not populist in their content, or their possible consequences are not populist, can be expressed in a 
demagogue way.  
To some extent groups that have been disappointed by the regime change of 1989, strengthened the 
camp of populism,li therefore they demanded the consistent completion of systemic change, or in 
other words, the replacement of the elite, a “second” or “permanent” revolution,lii and also want the 
strongly state controlled privatization. In addition to Csurka’s Hungarian Justice and Life Party 
(Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, MIÉP) this heterogeneous group comprises: some Smallholders 
groups; members of the Hungarian Market Party; former fighters of the revolution of 1956; political 
prisoners; former followers of plebeian democrat, György Krassóliii and groups that are dissatisfied 
with compensation, or attack the Constitutional Court because it annulled their plans of doing justice. 
Here can be mentioned those as well, who believe that the revolution ‘withered,’ the original goals 
were betrayed; and who demand a broad-based national unity instead of the ‘policy of pacts’ of the 
parties.liv The representative meeting of these groups was held in August 1993 in Balatonszárszó, in 
the spirit of anti-liberalism.lv The addresses of this meeting indicated that the coalition of the populist-
nationalist and national conservatives, created at the end of 1989, had been in disintegration.lvi The 
anti-institutional argumentation was similar, but the rhetoric employed the concepts of civil society in 
the case of populist organizations such as the “Committee of Social Adjustment,” the “Intellectual-
Moral Parliament,” or the “Civic Movement for the Republic.” Economic nationalism, almost always 
accompanying populist politics, appears in these groups: it is mostly they who object to, and hence 
wish to limit the inflow of foreign capital, or who want to prohibit the purchase of land by foreigners 
once and for all.  
 The initiative of the Association of People Living Below Subsistence Level (Létminimum Alatt Élők 
Társasága, LÁÉT) at the end of 1992 may be regarded in many respects as an “underclass” populist 
experience, because it aimed at creating a social coalition going beyond the poor strata and crossing 
boundaries for the support it demands. At first the Association organized a hunger strike against the 
anti-social policy of the government, and next it collected hundred thousand signatures for a plebiscite 
that would oblige the government to dissolve itself before the elections were due. This was an 
initiative coming from below, which successfully utilized the general dissatisfaction of the public 
against the Parliament and the parties, and could turn against the entire political elite. The plebiscite 
was not held; hence the real actual opinion of society remained unknown. However, when the 
Constitutional Court declared the initiative anti-constitutional, it did not provoke a new wave of 
protest across society, which shows that the action of the LÁÉT was not based on a real multi-class 
alliance, but expressed only the dissatisfaction of the poorest strata.  
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After the shock of political and economic transition, the political class in power had to face the 
challenge of democratic consolidation. In theory, consolidation is the policy of social peace, healing of 
wounds and the common prosperity to a gradually widening segment of the population. It is a policy 
that encourages a diversity of identities, instead of forcing them into the over-simplified, dichotomy-
based worlds of the political left and right. Liberal democracy can secure both freedom in politics and 
freedom from politics at the same time – for this reason, the idea of “permanent revolution” is alien to 
its rhetoric and essence. 
 
 
7. Reinterpreting democratic consolidation: Populism as anti-liberalism (1998-2002) 
 
The coalition government of Fidesz and the Smallholders’ Party, led by Viktor Orbán attempted to 
consolidate democracy by using the controversial slogan of “all-out attack” in the period of 1998-
2002. This proved to be contradictory policy. As it soon came out, consolidation could not be 
concluded by further dividing society and widening the gap between social groups. Consolidation 
could not be done by reducing the political field to one dimension, namely to the dichotomy of friend 
or foe. In 1998 Viktor Orbán felt that it was the last moment to rearrange power structures and 
implementing elite change. The program “more than government change” was an effort to modernize 
the right. It intended to build a “Fidesz-Hungary” in order to help take root a new political structure in 
the name of second revolution. Orbán believed that it was better if two oligarchies compete for power, 
than if there is just one, therefore he made the effort to organize a possible economic and social base 
for the contest for a divided Hungary. Instead of social reforms he saw it as his mission to change the 
elite, secure key positions for his supporters, construct a new base of support, and construct an 
institutional background for Fidesz once and for all. He could not align the majority of the people with 
his program.  
The first Orbán government consciously but mistakenly identified the political community with the 
cultural community (even though the latter notion was only with reference to the right) and it 
contributed to its electoral defeat in 2002. It is one of the basic characteristics of liberal democracy 
that political and cultural communities are utterly different: any number of cultural communities might 
peacefully coexist within a single political one. Anyone trying to force an existing (and culturally 
heterogeneous) political community to follow the norms of one specific cultural community loudly 
proclaims that he is not committed to the principles of liberal democracy. The first Fidesz government 
tried to balance the division of the political community with the reconstruction of the imaginary 
cultural community of the nation outside the borders.lvii It became more important what Orbán 
considered himself to be the leader of a country or of a state? While he was constantly making 
reference to the 15 million Hungarians, the citizens felt that he was only realizing the interest of voters 
on the right; and it caused tensions in the policy of the Orbán-government. When he argued for the 
spiritual strengthening of Hungarians and reuniting them (which brought with it the suspicion of being 
nationalistic), the left side of the country could easily have felt that this rhetoric of the spiritual 
reunification of Hungarians across borders was only used to make people accept the symbolic and 
normative structure of an imaginary cultural community that was dear to the government. It was 
capable of causing fear.  
It seemed that the first Orbán-government inclined to restructure the entire society from above, with 
the values and models of one particular cultural group. The government does have a function of 
organizing society, but the organization of cultural communities is not its responsibility or task, it 
generally occurs form below, following civic models. The Prime Minister sent the message that “the 
future is here” in vain, because as it soon became obvious: the past could not be wiped out for long. 
They could have won in 2002 with a calm, mature, conservative-liberal policy, but with anti-liberal 
radicalism it was defeated.  
The Illusion of Inclusion:Configurations of Populism in Hungary 
 
11 
With the policy of social mobilization, Orbán re-drew the political map, as it had happened in the 
1940s and 1950s in Argentina under Perón, or in the 1990s in Croatia under Tudjman, and in Slovakia 
under Meciar. All these countries saw the supporters of illiberal, populist democracy opposing the 
supporters of liberal democracy. A similar move was observable in Italy in 2001, where the former 
power of the multiple parties has disappeared, and the frontline of political struggle lay between pro-
Berlusconi and anti-Berlusconi groups. Some observers compared it to the U.K. governed by 
Blair.lviii The Hungarian election campaign of 2002 saw the fierce and emotionally overheated fright 
of the pro-Orbán and anti-Orbán political coalitions. The “cold civil war” took the shape of a hot 
campaign. Although Fidesz-MPP lost the election politically, Orbán could manage to create a “second 
Hungary” politically, with its own cultural milieu, which survived despite the electoral defeats. 
This sort of political style is often called populist policy, i. e. when the democratic process is 
represented as a choice between life and death, truth and lie, past and future, good and evil. As I 
mentioned earlier, populism also entails a re-definition of the role to the state, by emphasizing its 
distributive role. Other characteristics of populism are: a kind of economic nationalism, a moralistic 
rhetoric constantly referring to the idea of the nation and justice, a steady process of searching out and 
stigmatizing the “enemies of the nation” (traitors within, communists, Big Business, financial 
oligarchy, cosmopolitan intellectuals and so on), and the polarization and reduction of political 
pluralism to a one single dimension. During those few years political competition did not center 
around different programs and rationally debatable arguments but was reduced to a passionate and 
symbolically mediated meta-political war of “us vs. them” which was justified with “cultural” reasons. 
National symbols (the flag, the circle ribbon, and the national anthem) that represent the unity of the 
nation were appropriated by Fidesz and its supporters, thus stressing the idea of division. The slogan 
known from football “Go Hungary” and “Go Hungarians” became the campaign slogan of the party, 
similarly to the ‘Forza Italia!”lix The community of national politics was identified with the circle of 
Fidesz supporters, and they were called upon to “defend the nation.”lx Soon it was evident that 
populism did not need intellectuals, rather propagandists.  
One of the most important components of a populist policy that is centered on a leader is a technique 
of personalization of power.lxi Modern democracy is, in many ways, a media democracy, a campaign 
democracy. In such a world, anyone who can simplify his ideas and communicate real or apparent 
truths in a watered-down but credible way gets the upper hand. Most people prefer parties that 
transform politics into a visual experience as opposed to those that convey their policies using the 
classic devices of verbal debates and programs. Feeling it becomes more important than conscious 
understanding and acceptance. These feelings are most accessible through those charismatic 
personalities who communicate the message of the party. The personality that conveys the message 
becomes the message itself.lxii In this way the political leader becomes the leader of a charismatic 
group that is similar to a religious community, and becomes a figure who is central to the experience, 
and whose politics give those youth who are searching for identity the opportunity to “feel” it. In a 
“leader-democracy”,lxiii for the followers of the policy, it conveys the message of experience, 
immersion and a sense of belonging together; ideologies become identities; the rational-argumentative 
type of policy becomes a policy of identity. 
At the millennium it already became visible that some segments of Hungarian society felt a need for 
this type of claustrophobic, anti-liberal, commanding behavior.lxiv Those living in the countryside 
needed it more than people living in towns. They could feel that there is someone who tells them what 
should be done in that irrational, decadent and confusing world in an understandable and simple way. 
During the period of the first Orbán-government changes took place in the manner of exercising power 
which had long lasting consequences.lxv These include changes in political communication, in making 
politics more dynamic, in conditioning people to think long term, (a picture of the future), and aspiring 
to make politicians more comprehensible and clear to common people. The first Orbán-government 
looked beyond everyday problems, and focused on forming an understandable and attractive picture of 
the future in a more propagandistic way. The elections however, proved that voters were more 
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interested in the present, than in the past, and believed in the dreams and successes of the future if they 
could see it begin in their present. Hungarian voters were not in the situation to be able to disregard the 
circumstances of their everyday lives. 
In his statements after the lost elections of 2002 Viktor Orbán found no connections between the 
performance of the government, and the defeat of Fidesz.lxvi He tended to explain the defeat with 
transcendental causes, and started to establish a populist mythology about his own performance 
against those who allegedly served “foreign interests” and regarded their homeland as a “stock 
company”. To oppose this Orbán chose a mythical role to be the spiritual leader of the people, and 
made it clear that he did not want to get used to parliamentary politics again. For one year following 
the elections, he refused to accept posts in the party or within the faction, and had aversions from the 
traditional roles in opposition. By organizing “civic circles”, and spontaneously active groups, he 
transferred his political activities into the activities of a movement,lxvii and announced his belief that 
his followers were not in a minority because the “nation cannot be in opposition.” He wanted to 
represent the “nation” by rising above opposition parties, and wanted organize the infrastructure and 
social base of a new, “Future-Hungary”, that he imagined. He was still the prisoner of his own 
campaign rhetoric. From leading Fidesz as a party campaigning for election victory, he moved to the 
idea of building a wide political movement, a future right wing party union. The first Orbán-
government made an attempt, to realize goals, which confronted one another in one attack: the 
“revolution of souls” and consolidation. He prioritized confrontation to compromise in his politics, 
and voters did not like that. By the time he returned to Fidesz as President – after a year of internal 
emigration – he positioned himself as the unquestionable leader of his party and changed the internal 
party rules, procedures and regulations accordingly. Since 2003, Orbán has not simply been an elected 
representative of Fidesz, it is Fidesz which belong to him and represent him. 
The New Right government of Hungary led to a campaign in 2002 in which the idea of “democracy”, 
“nation”, country” and “homeland” could be turned against one another.  The government wanted to 
restructure the cultural community according to a (right wing) cultural value-system, and by doing so 
it suggested that whoever fails to agree with that, cannot be a member of the political community. It 
resulted in people, who did not believe in the “order-authority-homeland-work-discipline-family-will” 
type of value system communicated by the government, concerned. The government was offensive, 
because its members believed that the majority of the national political community was behind them, 
as well as identified with their system of values. They were wrong. With its voluntarism the cabinet 
alienated social groups which would have been easy to win over by a moderate center-right 
government.  
The first Orbán government slowly turned out to be slightly anti-Western, anti-American and anti-
liberal, but did not go as far as the old Left approach.lxviii It was a gradual move because, in the 
meantime, the government successfully negotiated Hungary’s entry to the European Union and was 
already been a member of NATO since 1999. Negotiating with the EU had a moderating and 
restricting effect on internal politics in Hungary, which limited Orbán’s room for action. Fidesz, 
however, which used to be the member of the Liberal International, left the Liberals in Europe and 
joined the European People’ Party party-family in 2000. 
The Hungarian New Right that had been created by Viktor Orbán between 1998 and 2002 turned out 
to be an unsuccessful political project in the short run, but it remained very strong culturally. Fidesz 
lost the parliamentary elections of 2002 and 2006. However, as we will see, it emerged as the only 
powerful opposition force afterwards.  
 
8. From social populism to elitist reformism: The socialist modernizers (2002-2010)  
 
Ten countries joined the European Union in 2004 among them were the Visegrád countries: the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. On the day of the accession three countries, out of four, had 
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a center-left, social democratic government in power. A day later, Leszek Miller, the Polish premier 
was forced to resign. He was soon followed by the Czech Prime Minister, Vladimir Spidla and the 
Hungarian Péter Medgyessy. They were replaced by new faces from the same political camp. 
 The Hungarian prime minister enjoyed a high rate of popularity at the beginning of the term. 
By 2004, however, it appeared that the initial successes of his materialist-redistributive politics faded 
away in the memory of the people. Although Hungary was not in a bad economic state, political actors 
sensed that there was a crisis in leadership. They felt that leadership was in a way absent, because 
governance took an ad hoc character and political decisions did not constitute any part of a more or 
less coherent narrative. No one knew what was happening for what reasons.  Political strategy was 
replaced by a merely reacting type of communication. Many felt that the socialist-liberal government 
would not be able to articulate why they were governing; what ideas and principles motivated their 
ambition. As long as the political right was mobilizing crowds on the streets, a message of social 
peace sufficed. As soon as the opposition calmed down, however, the slogans of peace and normalcy 
proved to be lacking for the platform of the political Left. Many had the impression, therefore, that 
following a promising start, things took a turn for the worse. 
 Why is it that such a “turn for the worse” happened to coincide with one of the most 
significant political steps Hungary ever took? This was the step the nation have wanted for so long: the 
true chance of catching up, the accession to the richer and more fortunate half of Europe, the 
membership of the EU that they were excluded from for decades. A national consensus supported the 
European accession almost everywhere. It appeared that it did not need any further arguments. The 
question arises whether one could find some regularity behind these changes of premiers that pointed 
beyond the personal character of these individuals. To answer to this question one should take a look 
on the process of transformation of reformist communists into post-communist technocrats. 
 People of the Visegrád countries, Hungarians included, expected some crucial achievements 
from the new political elite and those in charge of the regime change in 1989-90: first, they wanted 
democracy, second, a functioning market economy, third, a democratic political community and 
national identity, and fourth, they wanted their country to “join Europe”. Each wish contained one 
implicit desire for prosperity. These societies experienced being locked behind the Iron Curtain against 
their will as the utmost injustice history did to them – as indeed it was. Hungarians found it “natural” 
to demand that their living standards were on a level with those of the Austrians. Already at the time 
of the regime change, people associated democracy with prosperity in their minds. They wanted 
democracy, because they saw the wealth of the democratic countries. It seemed logical that those who 
have democracy prosper.  
The term “capitalism” was already viewed with disdain, but the phrase “well-functioning market 
economy” sounded convincing. It was generally perceived that a working market economy was 
needed in order to usher in prosperity. Redefining one’s national identity and one’s political 
community was important – especially in the newly emerged post-communist nation states –, because 
it had to be clearly defined who could take part in that prosperity as the legitimate member of the 
“sovereign people”. That defined who belonged to the nation and could be considered as citizen of the 
country. Finally, the European and the Euro-Atlantic integration appeared in the target of siding with 
the strong and the successful. 
 As long as the expectations of society were matched with international expectations, and as 
long as these expectations could be answered by formal, institutional arrangements, the technocratic 
and pragmatic elite of the Hungarian communist successor party, the Hungarian Socialist Party, 
MSZP) struck a note of accomplishment with their manager style modernization. The international 
academic world of political science cannot but acknowledge the proficiency with which the Hungarian 
successor party completed the democratic turnover after 1989, demonstrated a readiness to reform, and 
handled the crisis of the 1990s. It was no wonder: the leaders of that party – those who were socialized 
in the post-Marxist, anti-ideological reform period – preferred to see themselves as “neutral experts”, 
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standing against all ideologies. These pragmatic reformers abhorred political ideas, as those recalled 
the bitter taste of Marxism-Leninism in their mouths. Moreover, wherever they looked, they saw 
economic decline and political crisis. First they had to prove that they were able to think 
independently from the ideological outlook of the previous communist generation. They had to prove 
that they could identify a problem for what it was, without all the ideological dressing; that they were 
able to solve, or at least to handle the emerging issues. The great challenge of this generation was to 
do crisis management in the space between confined political opportunities and economic rationality.  
 By the 1980s there was not one member among the socialists who still believed in 
communism. For them, Marxism was an unclear concept of progress with a fuzzy, linear 
understanding of history with no world-shaking contents attached to it. After 1989, the general opinion 
among the socialists was that only the specific analysis of a specific situation, only conscientious 
management and the handling of the various crises mattered. So the flower of modernization was 
placed into an empty vase. The post-communist political elite wanted a normal, consensual world, free 
of ideologies. Since the desired consensus happened to be called the “Washington consensus” at the 
time, it came natural for these political managers to accept the international liberal discourse. They 
strove to attract capital, thinking it would bring about a society that functioned better.   
 Such politics could continue as long as only outside obstacles had to be eluded on this obstacle 
course of regime change, institution-building, economic stabilization, democratic consolidation, and 
historic EU accession. While the political right was occupied with rebuilding its base, it was the task 
of “the Left”, between 1994-98, to manage the economic crisis, to conduct the politics of privatization 
so far left unfinished by the previous rightist governments, and to show a friendly face towards the 
West.lxix The Hungarian New Right, as I pointed out above, stepped on stage in 1998 testing its 
newly gained strength by a confrontational behavior. It yearned impatiently to legitimize its new, 
proud and very distinct identity by any means. In its eagerness, however, it went too far at that time. 
They divided the country into the “decadent powers” of the failed communist past and the ‘bulging 
forces” of the rising national future. This confrontational behavior of the first Fidesz government 
created a deep divide in society, between pro-Orbán and anti-Orbán masses, which gave a chance to 
the socialists. As it turned out at the 2002 elections, a slight majority of voters, preferring peace to 
war, turned back to the well-known Left. The fright of the larger part of society was resolved by their 
electoral victory. The ruling sentiment was that the time of symbolic politics was over, that it was only 
a residue of the past. To gain success, one simply had to make trustworthy accomplishments. 
However, as it turned out soon afterward, for the Left to be successful more was needed than 
remaining a “party of peace”.  
 The concept of “welfare regime change” was already introduced by the then Prime Minister 
Péter Medgyessy in 2002, which identified a social problem, a political debt of the new democracy to 
its own people. It turned out that democracy has no value for the people as long as a general poverty 
prevails over them. There is no value in the nation if it is poor, and there is no value in the European 
Union if it is only a club for the wealthy, by downgrading the new member states. It was no accident 
that for both the referendum held about the EU accession in 2003 and the EP elections in 2004, the 
turnout was low in Hungary and in Central Europe. People did not think that technical issues of EU 
enlargement concerned them. Not that they opposed them; they gave their passive support instead. 
Having put the unresolved welfare question into the spotlight, it became obvious that one 
parliamentary cycle was not enough to complete a change in welfare politics. The inability to solve the 
problem in the short term led to the crisis of the political forces so far only labeled as “the Left”. 
Although in the 1990s they were successful in crisis management, new issues emerged that could not 
be solved in the same old way, by following the old schemes. Increasingly, the correct reaction 
required strategic thinking, ability for innovation and commitment by political values. The new issues 
were not about technical task resolving, crisis management, but about the political contents of social 
democracy. Such values were not to be articulated by experts instead of politicians anymore. 
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“Expertise” is irrelevant when it comes to choosing political values. Value-less elitist politics could 
only provoke a new wave of populism. 
 Nonetheless, the promise of renewal of the socialist party along „Third Way” lines looked like 
a promising process. It offered a hope that after one-and-half decades of post-communism things were 
slowly being put in place. One can think that the political left stops acting as the right, and the other 
way around. Everything was the other way around in Central Europe in the 1990s: while the Left was 
busy privatizing, for instance, the Right was „building a nation”. This had to stop. A kind of change, a 
renewal was timely and the ex-communist socialist politics had to re-evaluate itself, but those of the 
west, too. The influence of the anti-global movement decreased after September 11, 2001, the new 
social democratic politics of the once successful “third way” had to face the challenge of renewal. One 
had to consider whether the increasing crisis of neo-liberalism in the 2000s would also destroy its 
central-leftist, alternative variants or it would revive its nationalist populist alternative. 
 What happened in Hungary after 2004 was the connection of the region to the present 
concerns of the western world. By the decade of the 2000s, it appeared that the opportunities of the 
sort of externally driven, follower, or “catching up from behind” type of technocratic politicking 
which gained its identity solely from external sources and which denied the autonomy and the social 
context, of politics, had been exhausted.  
 In 2004, Medgyessy was replaced by Ferenc Gyurcsány, a dynamic socialist Prime Minister 
whose rise was considered as the political answer of the “Third Way Left” camp to the New Right. 
Gyurcsány was able to keep the socialist-liberal coalition in power as a result of his successful 
electoral campaign of 2006. His warrior political personality proved to be not as far from the leader of 
Fidesz as the more reserved Medgyessy was – that is why Gyurcsány was able to beat his right wing 
opponents. From 2004 until the end of the decade, the sharp polarization of the country was 
symbolized by the increasing personalization of politics that centered around the two rivals: Orbán and 
Gyurcsány.lxx After a few years in power, the socialist-liberal government of Gyurcsány was widely 
judged as “Josephinist” in its top-down, modernizationist reforms, and also too technocratic, alienated 
from people. Although Orbán lost two consecutive elections, he stayed as party leader and managed to 
achieve his long-term political goal: the social integration of New Right and further polarization of 
Hungarian politics. The sharp opposition of political camps resulted in protest campaigns against the 
government in the Fall of 2006 which culminated in street battles between protesters and the police.  
Finally, partly as a result of the global economic crisis of 2008, Orbán was able to reintegrate the 
political center on populist ground, and returned to power with a qualified majority in the new 
Parliament in 2010.  
Although the “negotiated revolution” of 1989 was largely elite driven, most people (rather passively) 
endorsed the new regime of freedom. They could travel, start their own enterprises and speak freely 
about their lives in public.  Free elections and a representative government, a constitutional court, and 
democratic opposition were all firmly established.  The years between 1990 and 2010 were far from 
being unproblematic, prime examples: a widening gap between the living standards of the capital city 
and the rest of the country, and between the life chances of educated classes and the Roma 
population. Still the regime was liberal democracy,  governing parties lost elections, and  the media 
aggressively criticized politicians. Democracy was consolidated, and the country successfully joined 
the European Union.lxxi  
The first signs of deconsolidation occurred in 2006 which were followed by the rapid decline of GDP 
during the economic crisis. The regime could not keep its original promises and was widely judged as 
corrupt. By the end of the decade of the 2000s, it became vulnerable to a new populist challenge.lxxii 
An era had come to an end, but anti-elitist, populist politics survived in the opposition. It represents a 
mix of nationalism and neo-liberalism in the form of a new populist politics delivered by the Fidesz 
government since 2010. With all of its problems, Hungary after 1989 has been a relative success story 
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in a worldwide comparison. But the success has been challenged in ways that were very much 
unexpected.   
 
 
9. Populism as a mix of nationalism and neoliberalism (2010-12) 
 
The victory of Fidesz in the April 2010 elections altered the developments of the previous twenty 
years in several instances. Although Fidesz received 53 per cent support from voters at the general 
elections, due to the oddities in the proportional electoral system, this translated into a two-third 
majority in Parliament. With such a super majority, the second Fidesz government was willing and 
able to change all fundamental laws, including the Constitution.   
The returning leader, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, conceived of this victory as „new social contract” 
or even as „revolution”, declaring the need for fundamental political changes, purportedly as the „will 
of the people”. Orbán  declared the installation of his “System of National Cooperation” that sought to 
replace the „troubled decades” of liberal democracy.  In a characteristic populist fashion, Orbán 
announced a “declaration on national cooperation,” a text which had to be put on the walls of all 
institutions of public administration.lxxiii As it reads:  
„We, members of the National Assembly declare that we shall elevate the new political and economic 
system emerging on the basis of the popular democratic will to the pillars that are indispensable for 
welfare, for living a decent life, and that connect the members of our diverse Hungarian society. Work, 
home, family, health and order – these will be the pillars of our common future.”lxxiv  
Many people asked whether it was possible to roll back history. They wondered whether it was 
possible to make a reverse transition, back to a hybrid regime within the European Union.  
Although the electoral campaign of Fidesz said nothing about these steps, the governing majority 
started a fundamental restructuring of the political system. The state has been fully captured and 
centralized. Public offices have been renamed as government offices.  Those in the civil service 
became easily and legally dismissible.  Central and local public administration has become heavily 
politicized, and the former colonized the latter ones.  All leading positions in the purportedly 
independent institutions were filled by Fidesz party-cadres. Retroactive taxation regulations have been 
introduced to punish the personnel of the previous governments.  Almost all major government 
promoted businesses were offered to entrepreneurs close to Fidesz, or personal allies of the Prime 
Minister. Central campaigns have been initiated against the “criminal elements” of the previous 
governments, as well as the cultural and intellectual elite.  The government press has started a 
campaign against the intellectuals and it fiercely attacked philosophers related to the former Georg 
Lukács School who allegedly received overly generous state funding for their research (which turned 
out to be untrue). Off mainstream artists, actors and actresses became targets of populist propaganda. 
Anti-intellectualism, intolerance of marginal groups and toward alternative lifestyles all belong to the 
characteristic features of populism.lxxv   
As opposed to mainstream European standards, a rare combination of anti-social policies have been 
enacted.  Populist and ethno-nationalist rhetoric overshadowed the ongoing neoliberal economic 
policy processes. By introducing a flat tax system, the cabinet has aimed to win the support of the 
wealthy against the interests of the poor. Welfare benefits for the homeless and unemployed have been 
cut from six to three months only, while more money has been given, in “the national interest,” to stay 
at home mothers for raising more children, promoting a traditional concept of family. New laws on 
public and higher education control high school and university students more strictly, aiming to 
significantly reduce the number of university students. These restrictions were presented as bonuses to 
the Hungarian middle class which was described as the holder of national interests. This middle class 
populism went effectively hand in hand with the exclusion of lower classes and the unemployed from 
the nation.  
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Strict regulations on trade unions effectively have limited the right to strike, and the government has 
campaigned against some trade union leaders, seeking to discredit the unions.  A so-called anti-
terrorist organization was set up, mainly to defend the personal security of Viktor Orbán and members 
of his cabinet. Electoral laws have been changed just a few weeks before the municipal elections (held 
in October 2010) in order to narrow the chance of smaller parties to enter local governments. The 
broad powers of the Constitutional Court have been significantly curtailed. Citizenship has been given 
to ethnic Hungarian who lived outside Hungary in order to gain more potential voters for Fidesz in the 
next elections. The private pension system was nationalized in a coup like manner, forcing people into 
the state pension system.  By doing this, Fidesz kept the annual deficit low to get close to correspond 
to the Maastricht criteria of the European Union. Importantly, while Fidesz pursued scrupulously 
restrictive fiscal policies to please the EU leaders, in the terrain of politics, they took steps that drove 
Hungary away from the rest of democratic Europe. A new era of populism, int he form of nationalist 
neo-liberalism, has begun.lxxvi 
Procedurally, all bills have been proposed, as “modifications” of previous regulations, by individual 
MPs of Fidesz, and not by the government, to avoid democratic public debates and to speed up 
legislation.  Commentators, analysts and the press hopelessly lagged behind this breathtakingly speedy 
legislation.  
In general, there has been an attempted “constitutional coup d’état” of sorts, by a single person, the 
prime minister. Government controlled public media (radio and television channels) did not give a 
chance for opposition figures to give their opinion.  Central propaganda machine transmitted messages 
of nationalism, Christian and patriarchal family values, with demands for law and order.  In the 
meantime, the governing majority changed the Constitution nine times in the past half year already, 
which effectively destabilized legal security, responsiveness and accountability. On top of that, in 
April 2011, the governing majority changed the Constitution of 1989 which is now named as Basic 
Law and it contains a long Preamble called the National Creed emphasizing Christian values, national 
history, plus unifying the nation as cultural and political community with state interests. Economic and 
social rights are fundamentally restricted, if not taken away from the employees.  The country is not 
Republic of Hungary any longer, it is simply called Hungary, „as the people call it”, according to 
Orbán. Only one sentence refers to the existence of the republic in the constitution. The President, Pál 
Schmitt, hand-picked by Orbán, was a former Olympic champion in fencing who had little or no idea 
about constitutionalism at all. Since Schmitt had lacked any political autonomy, he was removed 
easily, a few months after signing the Basic Law, as a result of his plagiarism scandal.  
Previous electoral defeats motivated Orban for feverish wish for revenge. Strangely, these defeats did 
not weaken his unquestionable leadership position within Fidesz, which he transformed from a 
democratic to a highly hierarchical, centralized party which is controlled exclusively by him. He is 
simply transplanting the logic of a boss-controlled populist party to a leader-state. The high rate of 
unemployment and the incresing influence of the state to all aspects of life have silenced many 
potential critics The popularity of Fidesz stayed for a relatively long time because new taxes were 
always presented as decisions that did not hurt ordinary people, but only banks and multinationals 
which served foreign interests anyway.  
Internationally, Orbán was often compared to such populist leaders as Lukashenka (Belarus), 
Kaczynski (Poland), Chávez (Venezuela), Meciar (Slovakia), Berlusconi (Italy), Milosevic (Serbia), 
Erdogan (Turkey), Tudjman (Croatia) and others. Some of these comparisons might seem to be 
tempting but most of them miss the point. Orbán is not like Lukashenka, because Hungarian 
authorities did not kill journalists, and did not jail, or forced into exile, anti-government protesters. 
Despite the fact that both loved European soccer, Orbán is not like Berlusconi as the latter had already 
owned several TV channels before he entered government while Orbán used his newly acquired 
government position to capture the media. Kaczynski established the „Fourth Republic” in Poland but 
did not change the liberal economic policy of the country despite his nationalist rhetoric, and he failed 
very quickly due to the existence of a strong democratic alternative. Chávez nationalized certain 
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industries and campaigned against foreign investors but he favored the lower classes in Venezuela 
while Orbán prefers promoting the upper middle classes and the national bourgeoisie with his 
economic nationalist rhetoric and neo-liberal policies e.g. reducing unemployment benefits and 
introducing a flat tax). Tudjman was an uncompromising nationalist leader, the self-elected founder of 
a „new Croatia”, while Orbán is much more like an opportunistic populist who mixed leftist rhetoric 
and right-wing economic policies with nationalism – just as he was ready to mix traditional values 
with far right ideas (although he presented himself in Brussels as the last bastion against the rise of the 
far Right). He pursued unorthodox policies like Meciar did in Slovakia in the 1990s, but he was more 
consistent in attacking and monopolizing democratic institutions.  
The Turkish prime minister Erdogan used his qualified majority to reshape his country’s political 
regime but the opposition gained strength after his first term and prevented him from further 
restructuring of the regime. As an opportunist, Orban was not afraid to praise the effectivity of China’s 
„market Leninist” communist capitalism while on visit in Beijing, while he equally encouraged anti-
capitalist, anti-globalist and anti-communist sentiments at home. As someone who is truly at home in 
populist politics, Orbán follows non-consistent policies: while aiming to reunite the nation with 
cultural nationalist arguments he redistributed the income of the state from the poor to the rich. His 
populism was based on middle class fears of being declassed and gave voice the antisocial, anti-
underclass sentiments of the upper and middle classes in Hungary.lxxvii 
Despite all efforts to the contrary, Hungary in 2013 still has a multiparty system, though its democracy 
is increasingly non-competitive and illiberal because of a rigging of the political, judicial, and media 
systems. Freedom of the press is increasingly restricted to the blogosphere and to opposition leaning 
journals. This is presented in the populist rhetoric of the government as a genuine „national freedom 
fight” against the European Union, the International Monetary Fund, and other Western, multinational 
institutions. Nevertheless these and similar attacks on the multinational firms and institutions just hid 
the fundamentally neoconservative-neoliberal character of his policies.  
The government enjoys a democratic “input legitimacy”, due to the free elections in 2010, even if it 
has not been followed by a democratic “output legitimacy”. This can be called the „tyranny of the 
(qualified) majority” in the legislature which gives permanent backing to the Prime Minister to feel 
like being the embodiment of the „will of the people”. This underlines the importance of a visible, 
prevalent and consistent democratic resistance to the authoritarian-populist tendencies. If Hungarian 
civil society resists this neo-populist challenge, it is possible that democracy may become stronger 
than it was before. 
 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The goal of this paper was to demonstrate that populism can go easily both with different political 
regimes (democracy, semi-democracy and non-democracy), and ideologies (socialism, nationalism, 
neoliberalism). It is one of the most elusive concepts in the field of the history of ideas and political 
science. Political changes in Hungary demonstrate that populism is flexible enough to complement 
both redistributive and neoliberal policies. Populist discourse always promises a new, more inclusive 
community, but at the end populist politics often promote new ways of exclusion.   
In democrartic societies the discussion of populism is related to the quality of democracy. As I 
mentioned above, some scholars distinguish between liberal and populist (i.e. illiberal) 
democracies.lxxviii Further research is needed to clarify whether illiberal democracy can be still 
considered as democracy or does it represent a milder form of a hybrid regime. The Hungarian 
„revolutionary” populist turn of 2010-13 offers a lesson for theorists of democracy as well: It 
demonstrates that the concept of modern democracy cannot be reduced to certain institutional frames, 
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because those can be compromised by authoritarian-minded leaders in the „populist moment”. The 
regime of liberal democracy can survive only if it is supported by committed and active people. This 
support for participation, on the other hand, is often channelled into populist movements, which use 
their popular democratic demands to achieve not necessarily pro-democratic but anti-elitist political 
purposes.    
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